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MONELL v. DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES: ONE STEP FORWARD
AND A HALF STEP BACK FOR
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 1983
Municipal liability for unconstitutional acts by municipal employees has been a subject of controversy since the Supreme Court
first addressed the issue in Monroe v. Pape.1 That decision and a
heightened awareness of individual liberties has produced a dramatic increase in the number of suits against local governments
and their employees that seek 2 to redress violations of constitutional
rights. This litigation sharpened the debate over municipal liability
under section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, currently section
1983 of Title 42, 3 which provides that:
Every person vho, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
4
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
1. 365 U.S. 167, 187-92 (1961). Justice Rehnquist noted recently that "[tihe decision in Monroe v. Pape was the fountainhead of the torrent of civil rights litigation
of the last 17 years." Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. -658, 724 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
2. "From 1961 to 1977, the number of cases brought in the federal courts under
civil rights statutes increased from 296 to 13,113." Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,
526 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing DIRECTOR
OF THE ADMIImsTRATIE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURT, ANN. REP. 189,
Table 11 (1977); DIRECTOR OF THE ADMISTRATiVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURT, ANN.REP. 173, Table 17 (1976)). It has been estimated that in fiscal
1976 almost one-third of all the private federal cases filed were civil-rights suits
against state and local officials. P. BATOR, P. MIsHmIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER,
HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 149 (2d

ed. Supp. 1977).
3. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1976)).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (emphasis added). The statute imposes liability only on
a "person" who deprives another of his or her constitutional rights. Courts have thus
been called upon to determine the "person" status of a wide variety of public entities. See, e.g., Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, 528 F.2d 499, 500 (5th Cir. 1976)
(board of trustees of municipal pension fund not person), vacated and remanded, 438
U.S. 901 (1978) (remanded for further consideration in light of Monell v. Department
893
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The controversy has focused on whether a municipality is a "person" within the meaning of the statute. While in other contexts the

term "person" has been construed to include municipalitites5 and

other governmental6 or corporate 7 entities, the legislative history of

section 1983 was interpreted prior to the Supreme Court's decision
in Monell v. Department of Social Services 8 as precluding any construction of this term that included municipal corporations. 9
The Court in Monell paved the way for municipal liability under section 1983 by holding that municipalities are indeed per-

sons. 10 The scope of this liability was limited, however, by statements in dicta that Congress did not intend municipalities to be
liable "unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some
nature caused a constitutional tort.""i The Court indicated that it
will therefore not recognize municipal liability under section 1983 if
recovery is premised on a theory of respondeat superior. 12
This Note traces the background of municipal liability under
section 1983 through the Supreme Court's decision in Monell. It
concludes that the holding in Monell excluding respondeat superior
of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)); Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 912 (5th
Cir. 1976) (school board not person), aff'd, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Hostrop v. Board of
Junior College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569, 576-77 (7th Cir. 1975) (by implication)
(junior college districts not person), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976); Keckeisen v.
Independent School Dist. No. 612, 509 F.2d 1062, 1065 (8th Cir.) (school district is
person), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 833 (1975); Forman v. Community Servs., Inc., 500
F.2d 1246, 1255 (2d Cir. 1974) (state agency is person), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. United States Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
5. See, e.g., Davenport v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 453 F.2d 185, 187 (5th Cir.
1972) (city is person within Railroad Retirement Act of 1937, ch. 382, § 2, 50 Stat.
309 (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 231a (1976))).
6. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Kaplan, 31 N.Y.2d 63, 66, 286 N.E.2d 260, 261-62, 334
N.Y.S.2d 879, 881 (1972); Pennsylvania v. Fullwood, 214 Pa. Super. Ct. 135, 139, 251
A.2d 677, 679 (1969).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 438 F. Supp. 945, 948
(W.D. Tenn. 1976) (chemical corporation is person within Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act, § 502, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (1976)).
8. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
9. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-92 (1961). Although the Supreme
Court had not held this doctrine applicable to entities other than cities and counties,
lower courts did so with consistency. See, e.g., Thompson v. Burke, 556 F.2d 231,
232 (3d Cir. 1977) (parole board); Canty v. City of Richmond Police Dep't, 383
F. Supp. 1396, 1400 (E.D. Va. 1974) (police dep't), affd sub nom. Canty v. Brown,
526 F.2d 587 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1062 (1976); Campbell v. Masur,
486 F.2d 554, 555 (5th Cir. 1973) (school district).
10. 436 U.S. at 690.
11. Id. at 691.
12. Id.
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as a source of liability under the statute is not justified by either
the legislative history relied on by the Court or general principles

of statutory construction. In addition, this Note argues that the policies underlying respondeat superior further support the applica-

tion of this doctrine in section 1983 actions.
1983
Subsequent to the ratification of the fourteenth amendment 13
in 1868, Congress and the judiciary embarked on a century-long
THE HISTORY OF MUNICIPAL LIABILITY UNDER SECTION

endeavor to transform the amendment into an instrument of protection for those injured by unconstitutional actions. Congress
acted first by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1871; the courts have
proceeded slowly, yet deliberately, in effectuating the congres4
sional and constitutional design.
The issue of municipal' 5 liability under what is now section
198316 first arose in Monroe v. Pape.17 James Monroe alleged that
early one morning thirteen Chicago police officers broke into his
home and routed him and his family from bed. While making the
family stand naked in their living room, the officers ransacked every room of the house.' 8 Mr. Monroe was then taken into custody
and detained on "open" charges for ten hours without access to an
available magistrate and without permission to call his family or atU.S. CONST. amend. XIV, which provides in part:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
13.

Section 5. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
14. See generally 2 T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N. DORSEN, POLITICAL AND
CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1447-48 (3d ed. 1967) (§ 1983 employed in
only 21 cases between 1871 and 1920); Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil
Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1323 (1952).
15. "Municipality" and "municipal corporation" are generic terms that overlap in some respects, but are distinct in others. However, the distinctions between
the two are irrelevant in this context and no attempt is made in this Note to differentiate between them. As used herein, the terms are synonymous and refer to cities,
villages, counties, and towns.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
17. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
18. Id. at 169.
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torney. 19 He was eventually released without being charged. 20

Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas declared that while the individual officers were liable, the city of Chicago could not be held

accountable because "Congress did not undertake to bring munici-

pal corporations within the ambit of [section 1983]."21
The Court in Monroe based its theory of municipal immunity
from section 1983 liability on the legislative history of the 1871
Civil Rights Act. 2 2 In its analysis the Court stressed the congressional debates surrounding the Sherman amendment. 2 3 This
amendment, as originally proposed, would have held a municipal
corporation liable for damages to the person or property of its inhabitants by private persons "riotously and tumultuously assembled." 2 4 Although the proposed Sherman amendment did not

19. Id.
20. Id.

21. Id. at 187.
22. See id. at 187-91. The Civil Rigths Act of 1871, also known as the Ku Klux
Klan Act of 1871, was enacted "to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment" 3 C. SANDs, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 72.02, at

375 (4th ed. 1974). See also Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 98 (1945). Section 1
of the 1871 Act is now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
23. As proposed, the Sherman amendment provided:
That if any house, tenement, cabin, shop, building, barn, or granary
shall be unlawfully or feloniously demolished, pulled down, burned, or destroyed, wholly or in part, by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together; or if any person shall unlawfully and with force and violence
be whipped, scourged, wounded, or killed by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together; and if such offense was committed to deprive any person of any right conferred upon him by the Constitution and
laws of the United States, or to deter him or punish him for exercising such
right, or by reason of his race, color, or previous condition of servitude, in
every such case the inhabitants of the county, city, or parish in which any of
the said offenses shall be committed shall be liable to pay full compensation
to the person or persons damnified by such offense if living, or to his widow
or legal representative if dead; and such compensation may be recovered
by such person or his representative by a suit in any court of the United
States of competent jurisdiction in the district in which the offense was
committed, to be in the name of the person injured, or his legal representative, and against said county, city, or parish. And execution may be issued on a judgment rendered in such suit and may be levied upon any property, real or personal, of any person in said county, city, or parish, and the
said county, city, or parish may recover the full amount of such judgment,
costs, and interest, from any person or persons engaged as principal or accessory in such riot in an action in any court of competent jurisdiction.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 663 (1871) [hereinafter cited as GLOBE].
24. Id., quoted in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 188 n.38 (1961).
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amend section 1 of the 1871 Act,2 5 it was the only place where mu-

nicipal liability was expressly raised. 26 Thus Justice Douglas concluded in his opinion for the Court that "[the response of the Con-

gress to the proposal to make municipalities liable for certain
actions . . . was so antagonistic that we cannot believe that the

27
word 'person' was used in this particular Act to include them."
The decision in Monroe left the scope of its holding unclear
and generated considerable criticism. The Court held only that cities are not "persons" under the statute. 28 However, the Court's in-

terpretation of congressional intent was equally applicable to coun-

ties and parishes since both would have been subject to liability
under the Sherman amendment.2 9 The issue was left unresolved
and lower courts were given no indication of which governmental

entities were effected.
A number of federal courts sought to limit Monroe by holding
that municipalities can be liable if they have no immunity under
state law3" or if a plaintiff seeks equitable relief rather than dam-

were rejected by the Supreme
ages. 3 ' However, these theories
32

Court soon after their inception.
In Moor v. County of Alameda, 3 3 plaintiffs sought actual and
punitive damages from Alameda County, California, for injuries resulting from the wrongful discharge of a shotgun by a deputy sheriff during a civil disturbance. 34 Section 1988 of Title 42 authorizes
25. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. at 666.
26. 365 U.S. at 187-91.
27. Id. at 191.
28. The Court held that the motion to dismiss the complaint against the city of
Chicago was properly granted. Id. at 192.
29. GLOBE, supra note 23, at 663.
30. See, e.g., Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 368-69 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (intent of
Congress was not to create municipal immunity, but to defer to immunity that existed under local law), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. District of Columbia v.
Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
31. See, e.g., Garren v. City of Winston-Salem, 439 F.2d 140, 141 (4th Cir.
1971); Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School Dist., 427 F.2d 319, 321-23 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037,
1038-39 (10th Cir. 1970); Adams v. City of Park Ridge, 293 F.2d 585, 587 (7th Cir.
1961). See also Note, Developing Governmental Liability Under42 U.S.C. § 1983, 55
MINN. L. REV. 1201, 1210-14 (1971).
32. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 512-13 (1973) (§ 1983 cannot support action for injunction against city); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693,
716-17 (1973) (§ 1983 cannot be used in conjunction with § 1988 to sustain damage
action against county that could be held liable under state law).
33. 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
34. Id. at 695.
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federal courts to apply state law in all cases where the civil rights
statutes are inapplicable or provide insufficient remedies. 35 Plaintiff sought to narrow Monroe v. Pape by reading section 198836

and California law together. California law arguably imposed
vicarious liability on Alameda County for the acts of its deputies
and sheriff. Plaintiff argued that when state law creates a cause of
action, section 1988 permits the type of liability rejected in Monroe
v. Pape. In rejecting plaintiff's argument, the Court observed that

the remedies under section 1988 should be "restricted to those
contexts in which Congress has in fact authorized resort to state
37

and common law."
Soon after the decision in Moor, the Supreme Court reviewed
a decision that sought to limit the holding in Monroe to actions
seeking monetary relief. The plaintiff in City of Kenosha v.
Bruno,38 relying on a strict reading of Monroe and the legislative
history of section 1983, argued that Congress objected only to
awarding damages against municipalities; thus, equitable relief

should not be foreclosed. Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court
rejected this contention:
We find nothing in the legislative history discussed in Monroe,
or in the language actually used by Congress, to suggest that the
generic word "person" in § 1983 was intended to have a bifurcated application to municipal corporations depending on the na35. Section 1988 was enacted "to explain the source of law to be applied in
actions brought to enforce the substantive provisions of the [1871] Act, including
[9 1983]." 411 U.S. at 705.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) provides in part:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district
courts by the provisions of this Title, and of Title "CIvIL RIGHTS" and of Title "Cmics," for the protection of all persons in the United States in their
civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to
carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the
object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and
changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is
not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall
be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the
cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on the
party found guilty.
37. 411 U.S. at 701. Some of the examples cited by the Court were the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1976), and the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1976). 411 U.S. at 701 n.11.
38. 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
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ture of the relief sought against them. Since, as the Court held
in Monroe, "Congress did not undertake to bring municipal corporations within the ambit of" § 1983, they are outside of its ambit for purposes of equitable relief as well as for damages. 39
Monroe, Moor, and Kenosha effectively foreclosed municipal
liability under section 1983. Therefore, individuals seeking relief
from municipalities for deprivations of their civil rights often
invoked the fourteenth amendment directly, relying on Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents. 40 Bivens held that, in the absence of
a statutory remedy, courts have inherent power to fashion common
law remedies for constitutional wrongs. 4 1 The facts of Bivens precluded application of section 1983. Plaintiff claimed injuries resulting from his arrest without probable cause and the use of unreasonable force by six agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.
Even if the agents' conduct were found to violate the fourth
amendment, no statutory remedy was available. Section 1983 cannot provide relief against a federal agency, because it applies, by
its terms, only to the unconstitutional actions of states. The Federal Torts Claims Act,42 which permits suits against the United
States, was also unavailable because, at that time, it exempted in43
tentional torts.
Defendants argued that, in the absence of a federal statutory
remedy, only state remedies should apply. Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court rejected this argument: " '[W]here federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to
39. Id. at 513 (citation omitted) (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187

(1961)).
40. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Federal jurisdiction in a Bivens-type action is
grounded in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976), which requires a federal question and at least
$10,000 in controversy.
41. Scholars have embraced this concept. See Hundt, Suing Municipalities Directly Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 770 (1975); Note, Municipal Liability in Damages for Violations of ConstitutionalRights--Fashioninga
Cause of Action Directly From the Constitution-Braultv. Town of Milton, 7 CONN.
L. REv. 552 (1975); Comment, Implying a Damage Remedy Against Municipalities
Directly Under the FourteenthAmendment: CongressionalAction as an Obstacle to
Extension of the Bivens Doctrine, 36 MD. L. REv. 123 (1976).
42. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680 (1976).
43. The Federal Torts Claims Act has been subsequently amended, effective
March 16, 1974, to allow suits for claims arising out of, inter alia, assault, battery,
and false arrest. Act of March 16, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-253, § 2, 88 Stat. 50 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976)).
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grant the necessary relief.' "44 In Bivens, such federal relief could
only be based directly on the fourth amendment. Thus, the Court
concluded: One who "can demonstrate an injury consequent upon
the violation ... of his [constitutional] rights, is entitled to redress
his injury through [a claim for damages, which is a] remedial
mechanism normally available in the federal courts." 4 5 This holding
has been applied to deprivations of a number of constitutional
rights. 4 6 Significantly, the Bivens rationale has been relied on by
federal courts as a basis for sustaining jurisdiction on federal question grounds4 7 in actions against municipalities; thus circumventing
the "person" limitation in section 1983.48 Bivens, therefore, offers a

viable alternative to those unable to obtain redress under section
1983. The significance of this alternative, however, must be
reassessed in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Monell v.
Department of Social Services.4 9 While the Court in Monell expressly overruled the holding in Monroe v. Pape that municipalities are immune from liability under section 1983,50 it indicated
that municipalities are not proper defendants in 1983 actions premised on respondeat superior. 51 The Supreme Court has yet to rule
44.

403 U.S. at 392 (citations omitted) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684

(1946)).
45.

Id. at 397 (citations omitted). The essence of Justice Brennan's approach is

that a damage action is a "remedial mechanism normally available in the federal
courts." Therefore, where Congress has not provided the victims of unconstitutional
conduct with a remedy, a damage action should be permitted directly under the
Constitution. Id. at 396-97. Bivens, therefore, allows an action for damages whenever
there are no "special factors" militating against this remedy.
46. See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1977) (fourteenth amendment), vacated and remanded, 438 U.S. 902 (1978) (remanded for further consideration in light of Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978)); Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975) (first amendment); Apton v.
Wilson, 506 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (fourth and fifth amendments); Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfield, 410 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1976) (sixth amendment);
Patmore v. Carlson, 392 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. I11. 1975) (eighth amendment); Howard
v. Warden, 348 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D. Va. 1972) (ninth amendment), appeal dismissed,
474 F.2d 1341 (4th Cir. 1973).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
48. See, e.g., Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569,
577 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976); Gray v. Union County Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520 F.2d 803, 805 (9th Cir. 1975); Roane v. Callisburg Independent School Dist., 511 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1975); Panzarella v. Boyle, 406 F. Supp.
787, 796 (D.R.I. 1975); Revis v. Laird, 391 F. Supp. 1133, 1139 (E.D. Cal. 1975),
rev'd, 541 F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1976); Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F. Supp. 647, 651
(N.D. Cal. 1974).
49. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
50. Id. at 664-8"9.
51. See id. at 690-95.
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on the extent to which Congress' limitation of a remedy precludes
Bivens-type actions. Thus, it is unclear if a federal court can
where relief is precluded by a
impose liability in those situations
52
federal statutory scheme.
MONELL V. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

At issue in Monell was an official policy of the New York City

Department of Social Services and the Board of Education of the
City of New York that compelled pregnant employees to take
unpaid leaves of absence regardless of whether such leaves are required for medical reasons. 53 A class action suit was filed under
section 1983 by female employees of the social services department

and the board of education against the department and its commissioner, the board and its chancellor, and the city of New York and
its mayor. Plaintiffs sought to have the statute declared unconstitutional, to enjoin enforcement of the policy, and to recover
back pay for periods when they were capable of working but were
forced to take leaves of absence. The individual defendants were
sued as official representatives of their respective entities, not in
their individual capacities.
The district court concluded that the policy is unconstitutional. 54 However, because the board and city changed their policy
after suit was filed, the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief
52. See generally Davis v. Passman, 99 S. Ct. 2264, 2277-78 (1979) (indicating
that initial test is whether Congress intended to preclude alternative remedies).
53. Defendants admitted that the city of New York had a policy of forcing
women to take maternity leave after the fifth month of pregnancy unless a city physician and the head of the employee's agency permitted up to an additional two
months of work. However, the board of education denied the allegation that its policy was to require teachers to take maternity leave after the seventh month of pregnancy unless that month was the last month of the school year, in which case the
teacher could remain through the end of the school term. 436 U.S. at 661 n.2.
54. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 394 F. Supp. 853, 855 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 532 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The court relied on
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). In La Fleur, pregnant public school teachers brought suit under § 1983 challenging the constitutionality of
mandatory maternity leaves required by the Cleveland and Chesterfield County
school boards. Cleveland required unpaid maternity leaves five months before the
expected childbirth; Chesterfield County required an upaid maternity leave at least
four months prior to the anticipated childbirth. The Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision, decided that the mandatory termination provisions of both maternity rules violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment because the arbitrary cutoff dates had no valid relationship to the state's interest in preserving continuity of
instruction, and the challenged provisions created an invalid conclusive presumption
that every teacher who is four to five months pregnant is physically incapable of
continuing her duties. Id. at 634-48.
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were dismissed as moot. 55 The court only considered whether
plaintiffs were entitled to back pay for the periods when they were
able to work, but were forced to take leaves of absence. This relief
was denied because "[any award that would be made would, in the
last analysis, be paid by the City of New York," 5 6 thus circumventing the immunity conferred on municipalities by Monroe v. Pape.
57
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
plaintiffs conceded that the department of social services is immune under Monroe. 58 However, they renewed their argument that
the board of education is not a "municipality" within the
meaning of Monroe v. Pape, because it is an independent body
"not merely an arm of the city like the Department of Social
Services." 5 9 In addition, plaintiffs argued that the district court erred in
dismissing the complaint against the individual defendants because
city officials are "persons" within the meaning of section 1983.60
The Second Circuit rejected both contentions. The court concluded that the board of education is so intimately connected with
the city that it falls "outside the purview of § 1983."61 The court
based this conclusion on the board's government-like functions and
its receipt of public funds "appropriated [to it] . . . as if it were a
department of the city government."62 In addition, the court noted
that even though the individual defendants sued in their official
capacities were "persons" within the meaning of section 1983, the
damages sought would "have to be paid by a city that was held not
to be amenable to such an action in Monroe v. Pape."63
The Court's "Fresh Analysis" of the
Legislative History: One Step Forward
Writing for a seven-member majority, 64 Justice Brennan over55.

394 F. Supp. at 855. After the complaint was filed, the city of New York and

the board of education changed their policies relating to maternity leaves by providing that a pregnant employee will no longer be forced to take unpaid leaves of ab-

sence unless she is unable to continue to perform her job. Id.
56. Id.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

532 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Id. at 263.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 263-64.
Id. at 262-63.
Id. at 264-65.

64. Justices Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell joined in Justice
Brennan's opinion. Justice Powell filed an additional concurring opinion. Justice Stevens, who filed an opinion concurring in part, declined to join in those parts of the
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ruled Monroe v. Pape and held that municipalities are liable under
section 1983.65 This rejection of a holding that had withstood two
decades of challenge was based on an exhaustive re-examination of
the legislative history underlying the Civil Rights Act of 1871.66
opinion (Parts II and IV) that were "merely advisory and are not necessary to explain
the court's decision." 436 U.S. at 714 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist
filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Burger joined, arguing that the
Court's abandonment of a "long and consistent line" of precedent is unjustified. Id.
at 714-18 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Moreover, Justice Rehnquist is convinced that
the legislative history of § 1983 indicates that Congress intended the word "person"
to be used in a more limited sense. Id. at 719-24 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 664, 690.
66. Justice Brennan first laid the foundation for the Court's "fresh analysis" of
the debates underlying the 1871 Act, and the resulting reversal of Monroe, by presenting an overview of the "three distinct stages in the legislative consideration of
the bill which became the Civil Rights Act of 1871." Id. at 665.
The original bill contained six sections, four of which were directed at the suppression of Ku Klux Klan violence in the South, H.R. 320, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1871), and was reported out of committee on March 28, 1871, GLOBE, supra note 23,
at 317. Section 1, now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), was passed as introduced
with little debate. The remaining sections were heavily debated before finally being
approved with several amendments. Immediately prior to the Senate's vote on H.R.
320, Senator Sherman introduced an amendment to be added as § 7 of the bill. In its
initial form, the amendment made any inhabitant of a municipality liable for damage
inflicted by persons "riotously or tumultuously assembled." See note 23 supra. This
amendment was approved by the Senate. GLOBE, supra note 23, at 704-05. The
House of Representatives refused to concur in the Senate amendments and a conference committee was appointed. Since the Senate and House versions of § 1 were
identical, it was not a subject of this conference. As a result of the first conference
report, the Sherman amendment was amended to make the action against the
"county, city, or parish" in which the wrongdoing had occurred. See note 23 supra
and accompanying text. In addition, the municipality would be liable on the judgment of any individual defendant returned unsatisfied within two months of the
award.
The complete text of the first conference substitute for the Sherman amendment
is:
That if any house, tenement, cabin, shop, building, barn, or granary
shall be unlawfully or feloniously demolished, pulled down, burned, or destroyed, wholly or in part, by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together; or if any person shall unlawfully and with force and violence
be whipped, scourged, wounded, or killed by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together, with intent to deprive any person of any
right conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of the United States,
or to deter him or punish him for exercising such right, or by reason of his
race, color, or previous condition of servitude, in every such case the county,
city, or parish in which any of the said offenses shall be committed shall be
liable to pay full compensation to the person or persons damnified by such
offense, if living, or to his widow or legal representative if dead; and such
compensation may be recovered in an action on the case by such person or
his representative in any court of the United States of competent jurisdiction
in the district in which the offense was committed, such action to be in the
name of the person injured, or his legal representative, and against said
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Monell concluded, after examining the legislative history surrounding the Sherman amendment, 67 that Monroe was wrong in
extrapolating a rejection of all municipal liability from the amendment's defeat. 68 The amendment was rejected, not because its opponents doubted Congress' power to impose liability on local governments, but because a majority of Congress doubted whether the
county, city, or parish, and in which action any of the parties committing
such acts may be joined as defendants. And any payment of any judgment,
or part thereof unsatisfied, recovered by the plaintiff in such action, may, if
not satisfied by the individual defendant therein within two months next
after the recovery of such judgment upon execution duly issued against such
individual defendant in such judgment, and returned unsatisfied, in whole
or in part, be enforced against such county, city, or parish, by execution, attachment, mandamus, garnishment, or any other proceeding in aid of execution or applicable to the enforcement of judgments against municipal corporations; and such judgment shall be a lien as well upon all moneys in the
treasury of such county, city, or parish, as upon the other property thereof.
And the court in any such action may on motion cause additional parties to
be made therein prior to issue joined, to the end that justice may be done.

And the said county, city, or parish may recover the full amount of such
judgment, by it paid, with costs and interest, from any person or persons engaged as principal or accessory in such riot, in an action in any court of competent jurisdiction. And such county, city, or parish, so paying, shall also be
subrogated to all the plaintiff's rights under such judgment.
GLOBE, supra note 23, at 749.
The House refused to concur in the conference report, largely because it
"thought the Federal government could not, consistent with the Constitution, obligate municipal corporations to keep the peace if those corporations were neither so
obligated nor so authorized by their state charters." Id. at 668. A second conference
committee was called, which watered down the provision to provide liability only for
persons who knew of a conspiracy to violate civil rights and who could have prevented it. This second conference report was concurred in by both Houses and is
now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1976).
The relevant text of the second conference substitute for the Sherman amendment is as follows:
[Any person or persons having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired
to be done and mentioned in the second section of this act are about to be
committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the same, shall
neglect or refuse so to do, and such wrongful act shall be committed, such
person or persons shall be liable to the person injured, or his legal representatives.
GLOBE, supra note 23, at 804.
67. See note 66 supra.
68. 436 U.S. at 664-65; see 365 U.S. at 190. Monroe relied heavily on the remarks of Representative Poland, speaking for the House conferees about the
Sherman proposal to make municipalities liable. Poland objected that "the House
had solemnly decided that in their judgment Congress had no constitutional power
to impose any obligation upon county and town organizations, the mere instrumentality for the administration of state law." GLOBE, supra note 23, at 804 (remarks
of Rep. Poland), quoted in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 190 (1961).
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Constitution gave them the power to require municipalities to keep
the peace. 69 However, no one questioned Congress' ability under
the fourteenth amendment to impose liability on municipalities
when the municipality itself violated the Constitution. 7 The Court
noted that many of the members of the Forty-second Congress
who opposed the Sherman amendment voted for section 1 of the
act, confirming "that the liability imposed by § 1 was something
very different from that imposed by the amendment": 7 1 Section
1983 imposes liability on a municipality that violates a person's
constitutional rights, whereas the Sherman amendment obligated a
municipality to prevent violations of constitutional rights.
A second consideration of the Monroe Court was whether the
general language describing those liable under section 1983---"any
person"-can be read to include municipalities. Two months before
the Civil Rights Act was passed, Congress approved the Dictionary
Act, 7 2 which defined generally used statutory terms. This act defined person as "bodies politic and corporate . . . unless the con-

text shows that such words were intended to be used in a more
limited sense." 73 The Monroe court concluded, however, that since
the Dictionary Act's definitions are "allowable, not mandatory,"
Congress' animosity to municipal liability, evident in its rejection
of the Sherman amendment, indicates that the word "person" in
74
the Civil Rights Act did not include municipalities.
In Monell, Justice Brennan overruled this determination by
concluding that "municipalities through their official acts could,
equally with natural persons create the harms intended to be
remedied by [section 1983], and, further, since Congress intended
[section 1983] to be broadly construed, there is no reason to sup75
pose that municipal corporations would have been excluded."
The majority in Monell was therefore convinced that a detailed
69. See 436 U.S. at 669.
70.

See note 66 supra.

71. 436 U.S. at 682.
72. The Dictionary Act, ch. 71, 16 Stat. 431 (1871). The caption reads, "An act
prescribing the Form of the enacting and resolving Clauses of Acts and Resolutions
of Congress, and Rules for the Construction thereof."
73.

Id. § 2.

74. 365 U.S. at 191.
75. 436 U.S. at 685-86 (citations omitted). In addition, the Monell Court noted
that by 1871, corporations (including municipal corporations) were treated like natural persons for almost all purposes of constitutional and statutory analysis. Id. at
687-88.
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reading of the legislative history supports the conclusion "that Conunits to
gress did intend municipalities and other local government 76
be included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies."
Respondeat Superior Excluded: One Half Step Back
In overruling Monroe v. Pape to permit actions under section
1983 against local governmental bodies, the Court in Monell confronted one of the most challenging civil-rights litigation issues in
recent years: Whether the doctrine of respondeat superior applies
to actions brought under section 1983. Despite the overwhelming
77
weight of authority holding that respondeat superior is unavailable,
virtually every case that alleges a constitutional deprivation resulting from acts of a municipal employee includes at least one
claim against the municipal employer based on this common law
78
doctrine.
The respondeat superior doctrine is well settled: An employer is
liable for negligent and intentional torts committed by his or her
employees within the scope of their employment. 79 This rule is
based on rationales other than the traditional negligence doctrine
of fault. Although there has been considerable debate about the origins and reasons for the rule,8 0 a modern justification is that it
properly allocates the tort's costs. 8 1 To establish vicarious liability
under this common law doctrine, it must be proved that an employment relationship exists between the employer and the person
who committed the tortious act, 82 and that this act was within the
"scope of the employment." 8 3 The employer-employee relationship
is easily established in most cases. The more difficult question of
whether an activity is within the scope of employment is deter76.

Id.

at 690 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).

77. See, e.g., Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977); Milton v.
Nelson, 527 F.2d 1158, 1159 (9th Cir. 1975); Dunlop v. City of Chicago, 435 F. Supp.
1295, 1301-03 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Classon v. Shopko, 435 F. Supp. 1186, 1187 (E.D.
Wis. 1977).
78. See, e.g., Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1977); McDonald v. Illinois,
557 F.2d 596 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977).
79. E.g., 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 26.9, at 1389-90

(1956); W. PROSSER, THE LAW
80. See W. SEAVEY, THE
to "Respondeat Superior," in
James, Vicarious Liability, 28

OF TORTS § 70, at 464 (4th ed. 1971).
LAW OF AGENCY § 83 (1964); Seavey, Speculation as
HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 433 (R. Pound ed. 1934);
TUL. L. REV. 161 (1954); Note, Frolic & Detour, 23

COLUM. L. REV. 444, 454 (1923).

81. See W. PROSSER, supra note 79, § 69, at 459.
82. Id. § 70, at 460-61.
83. Id at 460.
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mined by applying a three part test: Whether the act was committed during the usual time of employment; 4 whether the act was
85
committed at the usual place of employment; and whether the
purpose of the act, in whole or in part, was to serve the employis
er's business.8 6 The underlying consideration in all three factors
87
the degree of control that the employer is capable of exercising.
Municipal liability under respondeat superior is ordinarily
based on the same rules that govern the liability of any other corporation or individual. 8 8 Thus, tortious conduct committed by an
agent or servant of a municipality during the course of employment
generally results in vicarious liability for the municipality. In
Monell, however, the Court in dicta refused to recognize the doctrine of respondeat superior when recovery is sought under section
1983.89
To understand Moneil's reasoning, it is useful to divide section
1983 cases into two categories: 90 "political" cases 91 and "constitutional tort" cases. 92 Political cases, such as MoneIl, 9 3 are suits
based on injury caused by the official policy of a governmental
entity. Constitutional tort cases, such as Monroe, are suits based
84.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §

233 (1958).

85. Id. § 234.

86. Id. §§ 235-236. Other factors often considered are the extent to which the
act in question is different from acts authorized by the employer, id. § 229(2)(g); the
extent to which the act is a departure from the normal methods used by the employer, id. § 229(2)(i); and the extent to which the employer might have expected
that such an act would be committed, id. § 229(2)(f).
87. See W. PROSSER, supra note 79, § 70, at 460; James, supra note 80, at 165;
Stevens, The Test of the Employment Relation, 38 MICH. L. REV. 188, 189 (1939).
88. See, e.g., Florida First Nat'l Bank v. City of Jacksonville, 310 So. 2d 19 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Ray v. City of Detroit, 67 Mich. App. 702, 242 N.W.2d 494
(1976); Snell v. Murray, 117 N.J. Super. 268, 284 A.2d 381 (Super. Ct. Law Div.
1971), aff-d, 121 N.J. Super. 215, 296 A.2d 538 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972).
89. 436 U.S. at 691.
90. See generally Levin, The Section 1983 Municipal Immunity Doctrine, 65
GEO. L.J. 1483, 1487-91 (1977); Shapo, ConstitutionalTort: Monroe v. Pape and the
FrontiersBeyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 277, 323-24 (1965).
91. See, e.g., Examining Bd. of Engineers v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572
(1976) (Puerto Rican statute permitting only U.S. citizens to practice as civil engineers); Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (regulation prohibiting public school students from wearing armbands); Rinaldi v. Yeager,
384 U.S. 305 (1966) (state statute deducting cost of trial transcripts from prisoners
pay).
92. Most of the recent cases have dealt with intentional torts by policemen and
prison officials. See, e.g., Meredith v. Arizona, 523 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1975) (alleged
unprovoked assault and battery by prison guard); Collum v. Yurkovich, 409 F. Supp.
557 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (plaintiff beaten by police while in custody).
93. Monell differs from other political suits only in that the official policy that
formed the basis for liability was not formally embodied in a statute or regulation.
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on injury caused by an individual official who, acting "under color"
of state law but contrary to official policy, 94 deprived the plaintiff of
a constitutional right. Since these actions are contrary to official
policy, municipal liability in these cases can only be based on
respondeat superior.
In exposing municipalities to liability, the Monell Court was
expansive in its ruling: "Local governing bodies . . . can be sued
directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief
where, as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or
decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers. " 95 Moreover, the Court indicated that local governments
"may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to
governmental 'custom' even though such a custom has not received
formal approval through the body's official decisionmaldng channels."96

Although Monell expanded municipal liability for political actions, it refused to subject municipal corporations to constitutionaltort liability under section 1983. In its discussion of respondeat superior, the Court emphasized the language of the statute: 9 7 After
reiterating that, by its terms, section 1983 "imposes liability on a
government that . . . 'causes' an employee to violate another's constitutional rights" 98 by enacting an official policy, the Court concluded that the same language "cannot be easily read to impose liability vicariously on governing bodies solely on the basis of the existence of an employer-employee relationship with a tortfeasor. ' 99
Justice Brennan also relied on Congress' rejection of the Sherman
amendment to support his reading of.the statute:
[Tihe fact that Congress refused to impose vicarious liability for
the wrongs of a few private citizens does not conclusively establish that it would similarly have refused to impose vicarious liability for the torts of a municipality's employees. Nonetheless,
when Congress' rejection of the only form of vicarious liability
presented to it [the Sherman Amendment] is combined with the
94. The Supreme Court has determined that an official's unconstitutional conduct can be "under color" of state law even though it does not reflect policy. Home
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 287 (1913).
95. 436 U.S. at 690 (footinotes omitted).
96. Id. at 690-91.
97. See text accompanying note 4 supra for the complete text of § 1983.
98. 436 U.S. at 692 (emphasis added).
99. Id.
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absence of any language of § 1983 which can easily be construed
to create respondeat superior liability, the inference that Congress did not intend to impose such liability is quite strong.' 00
Finally, the Court in Moneil noted that policy justifications' 0 '
for the doctrine of respondeat superior were offered in support of
the Sherman amendment but were found unpersuasive in the face
of perceived constitutional limitations on Congress' powers.' 0 2 The
Court added, "There is no reason to suppose that a more general
liability imposed for a similar reason would have been thought less
0 3
constitutionally objectionable.'
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF MONELL:
MISCONSTRUCTION OR MISGIVING?

Justice Douglas, writing for the majority in Monroe, found
that three of section 1983's original purposes have contemporary
significance: Overriding state laws that deny citizens their constitutional rights;' 0 4 providing a remedy where state law is inadequate; 10 5 and providing a remedy where state law, while theoretically adequate, actually fails to protect constitutional rights in
practice.' 0 6 Justice Douglas added that section 1983 should be interpreted with reference to ordinary tort principles.' 0 7 Yet Monel
refused to recognize respondeat superior, restricting the statute's
scope and narrowing the class of potential civil rights litigants under section 1983. By precluding constitutional-tort victims from
collecting damages from a city or municipality, the Court made it
impossible or impractical for many potential plaintiffs to bring
suit.' 0 8 An analysis of the Court's reasoning reveals that a contrary
100. Id. at 692 n.57 (italics in original).
101. Noting that there is disagreement about the basis for the doctrine of
vicarious liability, the Court nonetheless set forth two justifications: Liability should
be imposed when it will most effectively provide incentive to prevent future harm;
and "the cost of accidents should be spread to the community as a whole on an insurance theory." Id. at 693-94.
102. Id. at 694. The Forty-second Congress felt that there were constitutional
limitations on their ability to impose obligations on municipalities to keep the peace.
Id. at 693. See note 68 supra.
103. 436 U.S. at 694.
104. 365 U.S. at 173.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 174.
107. Id. at 187. "Section [1983] should be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions." Id.
108. See text accompanying notes 156-161 infra.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1979

17

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7: 893
Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 4 [1979],
Art. 5

holding recognizing respondeat superior liability under section
1983 is justified. It is generally accepted that the civil rights statutes are remedial and therefore should be construed liberally.10 9
The remedial purposes of the civil rights statutes require a more
expansive remedy than permitted by the Court in Monell.
The Legislative History
It has long been established that the literal interpretation of
the words of an act should not prevail if they dictate a result contrary to the legislature's intent in enacting the statute and if they
are sufficiently flexible to reasonably support a construction that
will effectuate that intent.' 10 Despite legislative history to the contrary, the Court in Monell read the language of section 1983 restrictively to exclude the doctrine of respondeat superior. An examination of congressional intent reveals that a more expansive,
remedial reading is necessary.
The Court in Monell inferred from the rejection of a conference committee draft of the Sherman amendment that the Fortysecond Congress did not intend to permit respondeat superior liability under section 1983.111 However, the debates on the 1871 Act
demonstrate that the amendment was not defeated on the basis of
respondeat superior.
The Civil Rights Act of 1871 and the Sherman amendment
were introduced primarily to curb organized violence in the South
by the Ku Klux Klan and other private groups."i 2 However, section 1983 is "cast in general language"" i 3 that imposes civil liability on persons acting under color of state law who fail to prevent
private violence. 1 4 The Sherman amendment proposed a more
109.

3 C. SANDS, supra note 22, § 72.05, at 392. See GLOBE, supra note 23, at

68 app. (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger), quoted in Monell v. Department of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 684 (1978).
110. "While the intention of the legislature must be ascertained from the words
used to express it, the manifest reason and the obvious purpose of the law should not
be sacrificed to a literal interpretation of such words." Peirce v. Van Dusen, 78 F.
693, 696 (6th Cir. 1897). See generally Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading
of Statutes, 47 COLuM. L. REV. 527, 543-44 (1947); Jones, Extrinsic Aids in the Federal Courts, 25 IOWA L. REv. 737 (1940); Note, A Re-evaluation of the Use of Legislative History in Federal Courts, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 125 (1952).
111. 436 U.S. at 692-93 n.57.
112. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174-80 (1961).
113. Id. at 183.
114. "While one main scourge of the evil-perhaps the leading one-was the
Ku Klux Klan, the remedy created was not a remedy against it or its members but
against those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to
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drastic remedy: Subjecting municipal corporations to liability for
damage inflicted by persons "riotously or tumultuously assembled." 115 The amendment allowed injured persons, or their legal
representatives, to recover compensation in federal court from the
county, city, or parish in which the riot occurred. 116 While the
Senate passed the Sherman amendment, the House 7refused to acquiesce and a conference committee was appointed."1
The first conference committee modified the amendment to
require that the injured party attempt to collect from the riotous
118
wrongdoers before turning to the municipality as a guarantor.
Even in its revised form the amendment remained unacceptable to
the House, 119 a majority of which believed that the federal government lacked the authority to impose a duty on municipal corpora120
tions to keep the peace.
A second conference abandoned entirely the expansive liability
of the Sherman amendment. Instead, the conference committee
recommended imposing liability on any person who has knowledge
of a conspiracy to violate another's civil rights and who has the
power to prevent it but fails or refuses to do so. 12 1 In this form,
the amendment was passed by both Houses 12 2 and is now codified
as 42 U.S.C. § 1986.123
Opponents of Senator Sherman's proposal feared that innocent
taxpayers would be unjustly punished for the wrongful acts of oth1 24
ers over which neither they nor their officials had any control.
For example, Representative John F. Farnsworth posited a series
of hypotheticals to explain his opposition to the report of the first
conference committee:
What have we now presented to us for our action? We have
a section which authorizes suits to be brought against counties
enforce a state law." Id. at 175-76 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
115. GLOBE, supra note 23, at 663.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 725.
118. Id. at 751, 755-56.
119. Id. at 800-01.
120. See text accompanying notes 126-128 infra.
121.

GLOBE, supra note 23, at 804.

122. Id. at 808, 831.
123. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 6 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §
1986 (1976)).
124. See, e.g., GLOBE, supra note 23, at 791 (remarks of Rep. Willard); id.at
787-88 (remarks of Rep. Kerr); id. at 776-77 (remarks of Sen. Frelinghuysen); id.at
771 (remarks of Sen. Thurman); id. at 762 (remarks of Sen. Stevenson).
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and cities in every case of destruction of property or injury of
the person by two or more persons in a riotous or tumultuous
manner, when it is done in derogation of the exercise of some
constitutional right of the person, or done on account of color, or
race, or previous condition of servitude; such, for instance, Mr.
Speaker, as this: if a Chinaman should be mobbed by three or
four miners in California or Nevada on account of being a Chinaman, he may sue the county in the United States courts and recover damages. Or, to take another case of a man mobbed in Illinois on account of race, or color, suppose a colored and a white
person get married, and some of the young men of the village
get up a charivari, not for the purpose of preventing any right to
vote, but because of color, then the person claiming that he is
injured may sue the county and recover damages. 12 5
Of even greater concern to the Forty-second Congress were
the perceived constitutional difficulties inherent in obligating municipalities to keep the peace. For example, Representative Charles

W. Willard argued:
[W]e have not by the Constitution imposed, any duty upon a
county, city, or parish, or any other subdivision of a State, to enforce the laws, to provide protection for the people, to give
them equal rights, privileges and immunities. The Constitution
has declared that to be the duty of the State. The Constitution,
in effect, says that no State shall deny to its citizens the equal
protection of the laws, and I understand that the declaration,
that prohibition, applies only to the States, so far as political or
municipal action is concerned ....
The city and the county have
no power except the power that is given them by the State.
They cannot keep violence away from me; they cannot protect
me in my rights, except as the State has clothed them with the
power to do so; and for the enforcement of the laws of the State
they get no aid, no authority, no power whatever from the
United States. 126
Representative Willard reasoned that since counties and cities have
no law enforcement powers other than those delegated by the
state, Congress cannot impose the duty of protection on them.

Moreover, without a duty to protect, it is unfair to hold a municipality liable for wrongs it did not commit and had no duty to
prevent. Representative Willard concluded that if any government
125. Id. at 798-99 (remarks of Rep. Farnsworth).
126. Id. at 791 (remarks of Rep. Willard).
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could be required under the fourteenth amendment to compensate
12 7
victims of mob violence, it would be the states.
Representative Luke P. Poland's remarks in introducing the
second conference report to the House of Representatives are more
conclusive:
I did understand from the action and vote of the House that the
House had solemnly decided that in their judgment Congress
had no constitutional power to impose any obligation upon
county and town organizations, the mere instrumentality for the
administration of state law. . . . At the same time we said . . .
there was a disposition on the part of the House . . . to reach
everybody who was connected, either directly or indirectly, positively or negatively, with the commission of any of these offenses, and wrongs, and we would go as far as they chose to go
in inflicting any punishment or imposing any liability upon any
man who shall fail to do his duty in relation to the suppression of
12s
those wrongs.
It is evident from these passages that the Forty-second Congress found it unfair to impose liability for failing to keep the peace
on any person or entity not bound by an affirmative duty to do so.
Fearing that it was unconstitutional to impose such a duty on municipalities, Congress rejected the first conference substitute for
the Sherman amendment, but retained its underlying purpose: It
imposes "liability upon any man who shall fail to do his duty in re129
lation to the suppression of those wrongs."'
The court in Monell noted that Congress "rejected those elements of vicarious liability contained in the first conference substitute."130 The Court inferred from Congress' "rejection of the only
form of vicarious liability presented to it"'1 3 1 that Congress did not

intend to impose respondeat superior liability under section 1983.132
There is, however, a better explanation for the absence of
vicarious liability from the second conference substitute. Congress

127. Id. (remarks of Rep. Willard).
128. Id. at 804 (remarks of Rep. Poland).
129. Id. (remarks of Rep. Poland).
130. 436 U.S. at 692 n.57.
131. Id. The municipal liability considered under the first conference substitute was not punitive or penal, but remedial in nature. There was no requirement
that the wrongdoer be either arrested, tried, or convicted. An injured party need only
establish that a crime had been committed to recover from the municipality. See,
e.g., GLOBE, supra note 23, at 792 (remarks of Rep. Butler); id. at 788-89 (remarks of
Rep. Kerr).
132. 436 U.S. at 692 n.57.
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believed it could protect victims of organized violence by imposing
a duty to police directly on every citizen. 133 Senator George F.
Edmunds explained:
Every citizen in the vicinity where any such outrages as are
mentioned in the second section of this bill ... are likely to be
perpetrated, he having knowledge of any such intention or organization, is made a peace officer, and it is made his bounden
duty as a citizen of the United States to render positive and affirmative assistance in protecting the life and property of his fellow citizens in that neighborhood against unlawful aggression;
and if, having this knowledge and having power to assist by any
reasonable means in preventing it or putting it down or resisting
it, he fails to do so, he makes himself an accessory, or rather a
34
principal in the outrage itself.'
Congress was certain it had the constitutional power to impose
such a duty. 135 Since any money received from a municipality under respondeat superior would ultimately come from the citizens,
the proposal finally adopted achieved a similar result by imposing
the widescale liability necessary to redress deprivations of constitutional rights. 1 36 Thus, analysis of the debates reveals that it was not
Congress' rejection of vicarious liability as a doctrine that prompted
the exclusion of such liability from the Sherman amendment.
Rather, it was Congress' desire to impose liability only on those
connected "either directly or indirectly, positively or negatively,
with the commission of any . . .offenses, and wrongs."' 37 Thus, if
municipal corporations had been under a duty to provide protection against organized violence in the South and had failed to fulfill
this duty, it is likely that the vicarious liability proposed in the
Sherman amendment would have been accepted by the Fortysecond Congress.
The Monell Court's misinterpretation of the legislative history
of the Sherman amendment does not end the criticism of its use of
legislative history to determine the viability of respondeat superior.
Since the liability that the Sherman amendment would have imGLOBE, supra note 23, at 820 (remarks of Sen. Edmunds).
134. Id. (remarks of Sen. Edmunds).
135. Id. (remarks of Sen. Edmunds).
136. Id. at 804 (remarks of Rep. Poland). The person whose civil rights were injured, or his or her legal representative, was given a civil cause of action against every citizen who could have, but did not, protect him or her. This provision was specifically directed against lynching and other forms of mob violence. Gressman, supra
note 14, at 1334.
137. GLOBE, supra note 23, at 804 (remarks of Rep. Poland).
133.
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posed on municipalities is radically different from that imposed by
respondeat superior, the Monell Court was incorrect in giving any
weight to the legislative history of that amendment.
The Sherman amendment proposed a drastic remedy: It would
have made every city, county, and parish vicariously liable for all
unconstitutional acts committed against its citizens by any persons riotously assembled, 138 "even if a municipality did not know of an impending or ensuing riot or did not have the wherewithal to do anything about it." 1 3 9 Thus, liability would be imposed by the
Sherman amendment even in the absence of intentional or negligent misconduct by state or local officials. 14 0 Moreover, there was
no requirement that any relationship exist between the wrongdoer
and the municipality. Respondeat superior, on the other hand, requires an employer-employee relationship between the wrongdoer
and the municipality.14 1 Furthermore, additional safeguards would
be provided by the scope-of-employment test.1i 2 The liability imposed by respondeat superior thus scarcely resembles the sweeping liability for failing to prevent acts of private violence that proponents of the Sherman amendment envisioned.
Linguistic Construction
In addition to legislative history, the language of section 1983
supports a finding that respondeat superior is applicable to the civil
rights statutes. In precluding vicarious liability,14 3 the Monell
Court relied on the provision in section 1983, as passed, that " 'any
person who . . .shall subject or cause to be subjected, any person
. . . to the deprivation of any rights . . .secured by the Constitution of the United States.' "144 For example, Justice Brennan rea138. See note 23 supra.
139. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. at 692 n.57.
140. Representative Willard stated: "We make, in fact, no provision whatever
in this bill for proving in court that there has been any default, any denial, any neglect on the part of the county, city, town, or parish to give citizens the full protection
of the laws." GLOBE, supra note 23, at 791 (remarks of Rep. Willard).
141. See notes 79-87 supra and accompanying text.
142. See notes 83-87 supra and accompanying text.
143. 436 U.S. at 691 (emphasis in original) (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1871,
ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13). In discussing vicarious liability, the Monell Court stated that
[t]he italicized language plainly imposes liability on a government that, un-

der color of some official policy, "causes" an employee to violate another's
constitutional rights. At the same time, that language cannot be easily read

to impose liability vicariously on governing bodies solely on the basis of the
existence of an employer-employee relationship with a tortfeasor.
Id. at 692.

144. Id.
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soned: "The fact that Congress did specifically provide that A's tort
became B's liability if B 'caused' A to subject another to a tort suggests that Congress did not intend § 1983 liability to attach where
such causation was absent." 145 The Court proceeded on the assumption that a governmental entity can successfully distinguish
between itself and its employees for purposes of constitutional analysis. Based on this assumption, the Court concluded that the actions of a municipal employee are not those of the municipality,
and the municipality did not "cause" the constitutional deprivation.
However, in drawing this conclusion, the Court overlooked a doctrine dating back to the original enactment of the Civil Rights Act.
It has long been settled that governing bodies, like corporations, are merely abstractions in the absence of the officers and
agents that give them life. 146 In Ex parte Virginia,14 7 the Supreme
Court relied on this rationale in giving substance to the fourteenth
amendment.
A State acts by its legislative, its executive or its judicial authorities. It can act in no other way. The constitutional provision,
therefore, must mean that no agency of the State, or of the officers or agents by whom its powers are exerted, shall deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Whoever, by virtue of public position under a State government,
deprives another of property, life or liberty, without due process
of law, or denies or takes away the equal protection of the laws,
violates the constitutional inhibition; and as he acts in the name
and for the State, and is clothed with the State's power, his act
14 8
is that of the State.
Shortly thereafter, the reasoning of Ex parte Virginia was extended
to include unauthorized acts of governmental agencies' 4 9 and offi145.

Id. at 692 (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1971)) (footnote

omitted).
146. Adekalu v. New York City, 431 F. Supp. 812 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). "[A]lU municipal actions are performed for the municipality by its human agents." Id. at 819

(emphais in original). See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1879).
147. 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
148. Id. at 347 (emphasis added). For recent cases following the Ex parte
Virginia doctrine, see Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1958); Kimbrough v.
O'Neil, 523 F.2d 1057, 1060 n.1 (7th Cir. 1975), aff'd on rehearing, 545 F.2d 1059
(7th Cir. 1976) (en banc); Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845, 848 (5th Cir. 1972).
149. See Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20, 35 (1907). In
this case, which concerned a reassessment made by a state board of equalization, the
Court asserted:
The state board of equalization is one of the instrumentalities provided by
the State for the purpose of raising the public revenue by way of taxation.
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cials. 150 The legal principle that a corporate body exists only
through its agents has, since early common law, been one of the
151 Even
doctrines on which the concept of vicarious liability rests.
today, many courts use little more than the simple phrase, "he
who does a thing through another does it himself" 152 to hold a defendant vicariously liable for the wrongful act of his or her agent.
This common law principle expands the causation requirement
of section 1983 to include respondeat superior. An official's acts are
those of the municipal employer; the acts "caused" by the official,
so long as they fall within the scope of employment, are "caused"
by the municipality. Therefore, the language of section 1983 supports the conclusion that Congress intended to impose liability on
municipalities for the unconstitutional torts of their employees, as
well as for their unconstitutional policy decisions.
Public Policy
We cannot run a human world on the principles of formal logic.
The test of our rule's worth must, in fact, be purely empirical in
character. We have to study the social consequences of its application, and deduce therefrom its logic. We have to research for
the mechanism of our law in life as it actually is, rather than fit
153
the life we live to a priori rules of a rigid legal system.

The Court in Monell expressly declined to consider policy considerations in reaching its conclusion.' 54 However, properly consid•..Acting under the constitution and laws of the State, the board therefore
represents the State, and its action is the action of the State. The provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment are not confined to the action of the State
through its legislature, or through the executive or judicial authority. Those
provisions relate to and cover all the instrumentalities by which the State
acts, and so it has been held that, whoever by virtue of public position under a state government, deprives another of any right protected by that
amendment against deprivation by the State, violates the constitutional inhibition; and as he acts in the name of the State and for the State, and is
clothed with the State's powers, his act is that of the State.
Id. at 35-36.
150. See Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 293-94
(1913).
151. See, e.g., Gifford v. Evans, 35 Mich. App. 559, 192 N.W.2d 525 (1971);
Snell v. Murray, 117 N.J. Super. 268, 284 A.2d 381 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1971), aff'd,
121 N.J. Super. 215, 296 A.2d 538 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972); Freeland v. Freeland,
152 W. Va. 332, 162 S.E.2d 922 (1968).
152. W. PROSSER, supra note 79, § 69, at 459.
153. Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 113 (1916).
154. 436 U.S. at 664 n.8.
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ered, policy militates against excluding respondeat superior from
the civil rights statutes.
In enacting section 1983, Congress created a federal cause of
action for traditional common law torts involving a deprivation of
constitutional rights by one acting under color of state law. However, Monroe's construction of section 1983 leaves the remedy
emasculated. 15 5 While section 1983 provides a federal cause of action against municipal officials, practical and legal obstacles often
frustrate injured plaintiffs. The first problem a plaintiff may face is
the inability to identify the individual officials responsible for the
constitutional deprivations. 1 5 6 In such a case the injured party will
have no recourse. However, even if the plaintiff is able to identify
the responsible officials, the officials are often unable to pay substantial damages. The hierarchy of governmental agencies is such
that those who have the most extensive contact with the public,
and the greatest opportunity to deprive citizens of constitutional
rights, are those most likely to be at the bottom of the organization's pay scale. 15 7 Furthermore, governmental officers and employees sued under section 1983 are usually entitled to either absolute or qualified immunity. Absolute immunity has been accorded
to judges, 158 legislators, 159 and prosecutors. 160 Qualified immunity
is available to other governmental employees in the form of a good
faith defense: 16 1 Municipal or state employees are not liable in
damages for constitutionally prohibited conduct if they act with a
reasonable, good faith belief that they are not violating the

155.

See 365 U.S. at 196 (Harlan, J., concurring).

156. See Burton v. Waller, 502 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1974) (court upheld jury verdict for all 44 defendant police officers on ground that burden was on plaintiffs to establish which individual policeman had fired allegedly fatal and wounding shots);
Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1972) (affiriming directed verdict for two police officers alleged to have 'brutally beaten plaintiff, on ground that plaintiff had
failed to prove whether defendants had actually administered beating).
157. See Note, Vicarious Liability Under Section 1983, 6 IND. L. REV. 509,
509-10 (1973).
158. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967). Accord, Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). "A judge will not be deprived of immunity because
the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the 'clear absence of all jurisdiction.' " Id. at 356-57 (footnote omitted).
159. See Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951).
160. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420 (1976).
161. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975) (public school officials);
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239-40 (1974) (officials of executive branch). See
also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1975) (hospital officials).
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plaintiff's constitutional rights. The consensus among the circuits,
however, appears to be that a municipality is not entitled to a good
162
faith defense.
Additional policy arguments for applying respondeat superior
are derived from considerations underlying the common law doctrine. The doctrine is often justified on notions of fault-the employer's failure to train and screen the employees-and fairness, often framed in terms of cost spreading. The municipality hired and
trained the official, and placed him or her in a position to violate
another's civil rights. Common notions of fairness dictate that one
wronged by an employee's acts should be able to obtain compensation from the employer. In addition, a municipality can spread the
cost of compensating victims of unconstitutional behavior. It is
more desirable for the loss to be spread among the taxpayers, who
are potential victims themselves, than for the victim to bear it
alone. Furthermore, a municipality can insure itself against tort liability more effectively than the individual citizen. Finally, holding
municipalities liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their employees may motivate them to institute more comprehensive
screening techniques and better training procedures.
An argument against adopting respondeat superior in a section
1983 context is the overbearing drain it might place on municipal
treasuries. Those opposed to the adoption of respondeat superior in
section 1983 actions concede that allowing recovery for unconstitutional behavior that results from an official municipal policy is
both fair and reasonable; but they argue that an expansion of liability to encompass respondeat superior would place an intolerable
burden on already overburdened taxpayers1 63 and cities already
verging on bankruptcy. However, the financial stability of municipalities has never been a consideration of a majority of the Court in
determining whether to impose municipal liability under section
1983 in nonrespondeat superior contexts.' 6 4 The Court noted that
the debates of the Forty-second Congress show a smiliar disdain
162. See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d 925, 934 (8th Cir.
1977), vacated, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 1977);
Hander v. San Jacinto Junior College, 519 F.2d 273, 278 (5th Cir. 1975). Cf. Hostrop
v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569, 577-78 (7th Cir. 1975) (school
board held liable despite good faith of individual members), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
963 (1976).
163. See City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 517-20 app. (1973) (Douglas,
J., dissenting in part).
164. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. at 664 n.9.
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for this argument. 165 At least one commentator has suggested that
to safeguard local finances, a limited immunity could be granted to
municipalities faced with actions of such extraordinary dimensions
that they significantly threaten a municipality's solvency. 16 6 In addition, Congress can place a ceiling on recovery under respondeat
16 7
superior if such liability proves too burdensome.
In other contexts, federal courts have been influenced by the
social policy underlying tort actions in determining whether the
doctrine of respondeat superior should apply.' 6 8 In Santiago v.
City of Philadelphia,1 6 9 the Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania
found traditional tort doctrine concerning respondeat superior particularly compelling in fourteenth amendment cases:
We conclude that the policy of justifying respondeat superior in

tort law has equal force in an action under the Fourteenth
Amendment. As Professor Prosser has noted, respondeat supe-

rior is a deliberate allocation of risk by which the costs, arising
from anticipated harm to innocent individuals caused by actions
of employees, are borne by the employer. This is reasonable
since the employer, rather than the injured party, is in a better
position to absorb the costs, insure against them and distribute
the costs to society. .

.

. A governmental entity can only act

through its employees and therefore the official acts of such employees are rightfully attributed to that employer-entity.
The need for respondeat superior in a Fourteenth Amend-

ment claim is particularly compelling because that provision is
165. See id.
166. See Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalitiesfor ConstitutionalVIolations, 89 HARv. L. REV. 922, 958 (1976). The commentator states:
The theory for declining to entertain such a suit might be that the Constitution does not mandate judges to undertake vast redistributions of wealth
to attack pervasive social ills, even where such ills may be traceable in some
degree to violations of constitutional rights.... The national legislature, by
virtue of its responsibility to the electorate, can better legitimate such massive social adjustments than can the judiciary.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
167. The federal government has, in other areas, followed this approach to limit
liability. See, e.g., Workmen's Compensation Acts, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193 (1976).
168. See, e.g., Sinkler v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 356 U.S. 326, 328-30 (1958);
Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 639-40 (1930); Ira S. Bushey & Sons v. United
States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Ira S. Bushey referred to the "deeply rooted sentiment that a business enterprise
cannot justly disclaim responsibility for accidents which may fairly be said to be
characteristic of its activities." Id. at 171. It could be argued that the occasional
unconstitutional acts of governmental officials are similarly "characteristic" of the
government's activities.
169. 435 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
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intended by its terms to protect individual rights from abuse by
0
municipalities and other repositories of state power.17
Thus, policy justifications for allowing plaintiffs to recover
against municipalities under section 1983 for unconstitutional torts
vastly outweigh arguments that might be invoked to oppose such
liability. Had the Court in Moneil properly considered the policy

elements underlying respondeat superior and their relationship to
section 1983 claims, it is doubtful that it would have reached such
an unjust conclusion.
CONCLUSION

Monell temporarily ended the debate about the standards for
municipal liability under section 1983. After reevaluating the legislative history pertaining to section 1983, the Court determined that
local governments, municipal corporations, and school boards are
"persons" subject to liability under section 1983. As "persons,"
these entities are susceptible to suit if the unconstitutional action
implements a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision
officially adopted by the local governing body, or if the constitutional deprivation occurs pursuant to a governmental custom not
formally adopted. In addition, the Court ruled that municipalities
cannot be held liable on the basis of respondeat superior. The
Monell Court could have rendered its holding on the facts without
ruling on the viability of respondeat superior; yet, in dicta, the
court unnecessarily limited the scope of municipal liability.
Analysis of the legislative history of section 1983 does not indicate that Congress intended to exclude respondeat superior from
the act. The language of the statute similarly offers no such proof
Since both were relied on by the Court in Monell, the dicta in that
decision is, at best, poorly reasoned authority for the proposition
that a municipality is not liable for the unauthorized acts of its employees.
The impact of Monell is uncertain and may depend on
whether a Bivens-type action 1 71 brought directly under the fourteenth amendment remains a viable alternative for an injured
party unable to recover under section 1983.172 Although Moneil ef-

170.
171.
172.
tended to

Id. at 148-49 (italics in original) (footnotes omitted).
See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
The future of Bivens is equally uncertain. It may be that Monell was inbe a retreat from Bivens insofar as Bivens offers an alternative vehicle for
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fectively precludes respondeat superior liability under the statute,
victims of unconstitutional governmental activity can still argue that
the Bivens rationale should incorporate the doctrine of respondeat
superior. 17 3 Thus, as long as a Bivens theory is available to plaintiffs, Monell's dicta may have no effect except to limit the possibility of multiple theories of recovery for the same wrong.
Eric M. Hellige
bringing suit against a municipality. In addition, Justice Powell, in his concurring
opinion in Monell, expressed reservations concerning a Bivens action, since he reasoned that Congress enacted a statutory remedy to serve the same function. 436 U.S.
at 712-13 (Powell, J., concurring). Despite indications that Monell might represent a
retreat from a Bivens analysis, the Monell Court's failure to address the issue leaves
the question open. The Supreme Court has shown a reluctance to grapple with the
issue head on. In Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.) (en bane), vacated and remanded sub nom. City of West Haven v. Turpin, 439 U.S. 974 (1978), the court of
appeals, relying on Bivens, ruled that the fourteenth amendment provides a basis for
an action against municipalities for civil rights violations committed by municipal
employees when their actions have been "authorized, sanctioned or ratified" at a
"'policy-making level." The United States Supreme Court ordered the
court of appeals to restudy its decision in light of Monell. City of West Haven v. Turpin, 439
U.S. 974 (1978), vacating and remanding Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.
1978) (en banc). Whether the Supreme Court's remand of the Turpin case is based
on the Justices' disapproval of the creation of a constitutional suit against municipalities, or whether it rests on subtle distinctions in defining an employee's "official"
action cannot be ascertained from the Court's remand order. The Second Circuit
interpreted the Supreme Court's order broadly. Upon remand, it concluded that
"there is no place for a cause of action against a municipality directly under the 14th
Amendment, because the plaintiff may proceed.., under § 1983." Turpin v. Mailet,
591 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 1979) (en banc).
173. But, while Monell does not preclude using a Bivens rationable to imply
vicarious liability directly under the Constitution, lower courts have shown a reluctance to accept such a theory. See, e.g., Sterling v. Village of Maywood, 579 F.2d
1350, 1357 n.16 (7th Cir. 1978); Molina v. Richardson, 578 F.2d 846 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 99 S.Ct. 724 (1978); Kedra v. City of Philadelphia, 454 F. Supp. 652 (E.D.
Pa. 1978). For cases reaching the same conclusion prior to Monell, see, e.g., Turpin
v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1978) (en bane), vacated and remanded sub nom.
City of West Haven v. Turpin, 439 U.S. 974 (1978), on remand sub nom. Turpin v.
Mailet, 591 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1979) (en banc); Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37 (1st Cir.
1977); McDonald v. Illinois, 557 F.2d 596 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 872
(1977).
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